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Abstract
Scholarly inquiry about the nature and significance of knowledge has been shaped by disciplinary
traditions and priorities that define “knowledge” differently and result in disconnected literatures.
In the mid to late twentieth century, library science educator Jesse Shera sought to bridge the
conceptual gap between epistemological and sociological approaches to knowledge in proposing
a new discipline he called social epistemology. Around the same time, long-term projects by the
economist Fritz Machlup and the physical chemist turned philosopher of science Michael Polanyi
did not merely combine existing disciplinary approaches but transcended conventional frameworks for conceptualizing knowledge. These scholars can be viewed in retrospect as bringing to
the study of knowledge the germs of a transdisciplinary approach. The concept of transdisciplinarity gained traction only after these authors produced their works and has been applied mainly
to scientific and technological topics such as climate change, nanotechnology, and sustainability.
However, such an approach is highly applicable in studying the meanings, uses, and roles of
knowledge in an environment that has changed with the advent of computer-enabled communication networks. Transdisciplinary accounts of knowledge ought to foster a dialogue between liberal arts and applied, client-oriented disciplines.
Keywords: theory of knowledge, social epistemology, knowledge management, sociology of
knowledge, disciplinarity, interdisciplinary approach to knowledge, transdisciplinarity, Fritz
Machlup, Michael Polanyi, Jesse H. Shera

Introduction
Many have observed that knowledge is central to the purposes of the academy and libraries. For
example, James J. Duderstadt (2000, pp. 8-9), a university president, aptly described the connection between universities and knowledge when he wrote, “Our universities exist to be repositories, transmitters, and creators of human heritage. They serve as guardians and creators of that
knowledge.” R. David Lankes (2011, p.
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Given that knowledge is an ideal to which these institutions are dedicated, what scholarly approach must we use to study knowledge itself, and how should such an inquiry proceed? What
research has been done on the subject, and where would we find it?
Knowledge is not an ordinary subject for research. In a sense, all academic discourse is or relates
immediately to knowledge, so trying to isolate it as a containable category for observation and
analysis seems as paradoxical as M. C. Escher’s lithograph depicting a hand drawing another
hand. Scholarly writing about knowledge does not cohere as a body of literature because authors
tend to represent different disciplines that have such differing stakes in knowledge that they appear to lack a common ground even on the meaning of the word “knowledge.”
Surveying the array of academic disciplines, it is apparent that no single discipline exists that specifically studies knowledge. Two contemporary fields we might consider as focusing on knowledge as a subject matter are knowledge organization (KO) and knowledge management (KM).
Neither is a full-fledged discipline, though both have professional societies, conferences, and
journals and are the subject of graduate level courses. KO, a specialization in library and information science (LIS), contributes to our understanding of the nature and significance of knowledge and may be heavily implicated in theoretical debates about the nature of knowledge (Hjørland, 2013), but it is not in and of itself the study of knowledge, only its organization through
cataloging, classification, indexing, thesauri, and other aspects of bibliographic control, such as
the relationships between works and instantiations (see Hjørland, 2003; Smiraglia, 2002). The
burgeoning field of KM is the source of most recent literature on knowledge. Contributors to this
literature include professional managers and consultants as well as faculty members from schools
of business administration and management, departments of organizational studies, and institutes
of policy studies. Although the KM literature includes significant contributions on the conceptualization of knowledge (Alavi & Leidner, 2001; Blackler, 1995; Spender, 1996; Stenmark, 2001),
it, too, is not in itself the study of knowledge but rather a “set of processes that create and share
knowledge across an organization to optimize the use of judgment in the attainment of mission
and goals” (Townley, 2001, p. 45).
Ultimately, no discipline can “own” the subject of knowledge as a problem for inquiry because
knowledge belongs to all scholars and inquirers. Part of the problem, one can argue, lies in the
very segmentation of knowledge into disciplines. Therefore, an approach to knowledge should be
developed that transcends the limitations of disciplinary perspectives altogether by viewing the
study of knowledge as a transdisciplinary undertaking. As we shall see, scholars have long recognized shortcomings in traditional disciplinary approaches to knowledge, and it is possible to
trace in their efforts a genealogy of transdisciplinary knowledge studies. A newly re-imagined
project on knowledge could make connections visible between various wings of knowledge research (e.g., managerial vs. liberal arts, deconstructionist vs. traditionalist) that seemingly coexist peacefully through benign neglect.
The purpose of this essay is to examine the problem of studying knowledge within educational
and scholarly settings through its connection with academic disciplines. It begins by comparing
and contrasting the ways knowledge is approached in philosophy and sociology. It then describes
early attempts to transcend disciplinarity in studying knowledge, and touches on the matter of
disciplinarity as a problem and subject in its own right. The essay proceeds by describing a
movement toward transdisciplinary in research and education that has been used in science and
technology but could be applicable to the study of knowledge. The centerpiece of the essay is an
analysis of two scholars, Fritz Machlup and Michael Polanyi, seen as pivotal to attempts to transcend disciplinary thinking in studying knowledge. The essay then examines their legacy by surveying recent studies in knowledge management (including informing science) as well as other
individual approaches. The essay concludes with a discussion of future prospects for the transdisciplinary study of knowledge.
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Epistemology: The Philosophy of Knowledge
Questions about the ultimate nature, purpose, and value of knowledge are philosophical questions, so it is necessary to start our discussion of the academic compartmentalization of thought
about knowledge with philosophy. Long before the advent of the modern university with its disciplines and departments, philosophers have been asking what it means to know, how we acquire
knowledge, and how we know that we know. Along with metaphysics, ethics, logic, and aesthetics, epistemology—the study of knowledge—is one of the five basic categories of philosophical
inquiry.
Epistemologists study the basic and fundamental aspects of the meaning and justification of all
knowledge. Traditional epistemology deals with the nature, sources, and extent of knowledge.
The philosophical analysis of knowledge is about fact, truth, justification, evidence, doubt, external reality (including the existence of other minds), and cause and effect (see, e.g., Alcoff, 1998;
Lucey, 1996). Some philosophers think that the aim of epistemology is to investigate the relationship between knowledge and objective reality, while others assert that the very notion of “objective reality” outside one’s own concept of it needs to be examined critically. It seems unlikely
that any proposed baseline of reality will be acceptable to all persons.
Knowledge is viewed by philosophers as a special kind of belief or opinion. Therefore, a fundamental question in epistemology is what criteria differentiate knowledge from other beliefs and
opinions. That is, what criteria must be satisfied for a belief or opinion to count as knowledge?
The so-called classical (or traditional) notion of knowledge in modern philosophy equates knowledge with “justified, true belief.” However, in a short article, Edmund Gettier (1963) demonstrated that justified true belief may not be knowledge, since lucky guessing may be involved and
correct but lucky guesses do not qualify as knowledge. For example, if a man drives in an area
where, for some reason, and unbeknown to him, many papier mȃché replicas of barns dot the
countryside, does he know he has seen a barn if he correctly identifies a real barn by chance
(Pritchard, 2009, p. 12)? The assertion that he has seen a barn would be true and justified inasmuch as the driver saw what looked like barns, but in this instance it is only a lucky guess, not
real knowledge. Could an assertion be justified but false? This is just a single example of the
kind of question an epistemologist would ask. Besides truth and justification, two more conditions of knowledge identified by the prominent contemporary epistemologist Keith Lehrer (1990)
are acceptance and justification without falsity. The latter seems on the surface to be covered by
the notion of justification, but Lehrer’s analysis shows it to be a separate factor.
While epistemologists may probe the implications and consequences of real world situations from
history, current events, or everyday life, the above example demonstrates a preferred method of
advancing theories through the use of thought experiments, in which hypothetical and often improbable, even outlandish scenarios are analyzed for their logical plausibility, consistency, and
implications. Arguments often take this form: If this is the case, then it follows that that must
also be the case. The purpose of this work, which can seem fanciful on the surface, is to push
back against commonsense assumptions about knowledge using logical analysis. Duncan
Pritchard’s (2009) text includes many such arguments demolishing common fallacies people accept as truisms about the nature of knowledge. The sticking points seem to hinge on the purported knower’s reasons for certainty, but any aspect of knowledge can be subject to attack. It is
no wonder that a significant strain of philosophical thought argues for skepticism that knowledge
is possible. Certainly, logical analysis may cause one to question and ultimately discard many
conventional assumptions and received popular opinions about the nature of knowledge.
Knowledge as studied by philosophers is idealized. Moreover, according to Barry Allen (2004, p.
5), philosophers (not only those who specialize in epistemology) have idealized certain kinds of
knowledge: “a view from nowhere, knowing things as they are, not as they affect another.” Allen
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describes the kind of knowledge adored by philosophers (and probably most other purist scholars)
as “perfectly useless and beautifully true” (p. 1). Steve Fuller (2002, p. 16), likewise, has mentioned “the contemplative, even ethereal quality of classical conceptions of knowledge.” Philosophers, who analyze and speculate about concepts and theories, largely created the tendencies
prevalent among academics in all subjects and disciplines to prefer to look at knowledge in a vacuum and at knowledge domains as objects of contemplation and connoisseurship.
This view of knowledge can be said to have shaped many if not all pure liberal arts disciplines in
the humanities and social sciences. “Pure” in this context means they are not affected by real
world applications and with them a need for real-world results. The philosophical approach described by Allen (2004) can be equated with what is referred to, whether derisively or longingly—or both—as the “ivory tower.” The scholar’s beautiful and useless knowledge contrasts
against knowledge that is useful somehow and that may not be beautiful but could even get ugly
as we leave the ivory tower and enter the streets and jungles of the real world. Unless a chasm
separates knowledge and other modes of thought, then if we accept this concept of knowledge as
perfect and unsurpassed, knowledge must shade gradually into other imperfect products of human
cognition.

The Sociology of Knowledge
Social scientists, led by sociologists, began in the nineteenth century to take the study of knowledge outside the ivory tower by studying ideology in the context of knowledge (Curtis & Petras,
1970). Such a topic requires one to shift from a purely philosophical, idealistic, or scientific view
of knowledge conforming to classical notions of truth to one centered on group action caused by
or related to a sense of certainty or being informed. For example, mass panics, uprisings, and
revolutions could have been caused by the spread of rumors. They were related to social control,
dogma, and charisma. What the sociologist accepted as “knowledge” for analysis using social
science methodologies might be just common belief, opinion, or even misinformation or delusion,
but it was guided by a sense of certainty.
Although sociological ideas predate the formal beginning of sociology as an academic subject
(Curtis & Petras, 1970), the sociological concept of knowledge seems to follow Emile Durkheim’s (1895/1938) notion of social facts, which, according to him, are forces of social control,
organization, and coercion. Because they occupy a different plane of reality than physical, biological, or psychological facts, they require sociological methods to investigate them.
The sociology of knowledge, in the words of Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1967, p. 3),
“must concern itself with whatever passes for ‘knowledge’ in a society, regardless of the ultimate
validity or invalidity (by whatever standard) of such ‘knowledge’.” For purposes of sociological
analysis, according to them, knowledge is based on the sense of reality. Therefore, they emphasize, “the sociology of knowledge is concerned with the analysis of the social construction of reality” (Berger & Luckmann, 1967, p. 3). The notion of socially constructed reality is uncontroversial in some instances: the vice-president of a company is vice-president by virtue of having been
appointed to that position by someone authorized to bestow that title and have it recognized by
others. More controversial versions of constructivism would claim, for example, that one is male
or female by virtue of social consensus and the decisions of socially recognized experts rather
than biological criteria (Fuss, 1989). “Truth” itself in this more radical theory is socially negotiated, and expertise is determined by social processes, through power, persuasion, and influence
rather than by objective measures, and “objectivity” is a just a hollow, self-justifying claim, a
means of gaining the rhetorical upper hand and setting the terms for discussion. Since knowledge
concerns human apprehension of truth and facts, this notion of social fact, whether applied conservatively or liberally, affects the analysis of knowledge. The more extreme versions of constructivism (e.g., Haraway, 1991; Latour & Woolgar, 1979/1986) raise the question of whether
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truth is optional (Hacking, 1999). Constructivism (sometimes also known as constructionism)
not only covers a range of intensities but is connected to different kinds of claims about what is
constructed (Sismondo, 1993). The many modes of constructivism/constructionism are evidenced in the 40 chapters and 800 pages of the Handbook of Constructionist Research (Holstein
& Gubrium, 2008).
Unlike epistemologists, who study the fundamental nature of knowledge using logic and analysis,
sociologists study knowledge empirically in its construction or organization, development, distribution, deployment, perpetuation, and uses, for example, in making decisions or in creating social
divisions and categories. As such, knowledge is not understood, as it is by traditional epistemologists, in terms of a logically justified concept of truth, but rather in terms of “mental productions” regardless of their epistemological justification (Maquet, 1949/1951, p. 4). Such notions
may not be scientifically or analytically factual but generally are characterized by people’s sense
of absolute certainty about them. (People can of course be absolutely certain of things that are
absolutely false, a phenomenon analyzed by the psychologist Thomas Gilovich, 1991, in an aptly
titled book, How We Know What Isn’t So.) Lacking a more precise concept of knowledge, the
sociologist can only examine claims of knowledge to see how a sense of reality is constructed.
Gender and illness are among the social phenomena commonly understood by sociologists to be
part of social reality. As such, knowledge about these domains is knowledge of social constructs.
Such a theoretical stance, taken to its logical conclusion, leads to a situation where any sincere
and unwavering but false belief is accepted as knowledge. Imagine a woman who claims she is a
man, lives as a man, and convinces others she is a man. Is the belief she is a man knowledge? In
this instance, the answer could depend on how one views the truth or reality of gender: The subjective, lived experience or the outward expression of gender could override chromosomal or anatomical realities. But a similar question could be asked about the belief that a person who receives a diagnosis of and treatment for cancer but who has no cancerous cells in his body has
cancer. If whatever people believe is knowledge, then this belief is knowledge. The patient may
be reasonable in trusting the diagnosis of the person he consulted, and he may experience all the
anxieties and other difficulties of being a cancer patient, but however the diagnosis was made, it
was inaccurate and erroneous. To the extent that accuracy and its opposite, error, are factors in
determining what knowledge is, an inaccurate and erroneous belief is not knowledge but
nonknowledge (Bernstein, 2009a, 2009b).
For some social scientists, the distinction between belief and knowledge is irrelevant, as they
view their goals as showing the connections between knowledge (or belief) and actions and practices, rather than determining the truth value of assertions (Pelto & Pelto, 1997). But the truth
value of assertions about social facts can be highly consequential, for example, in historical narratives.
Both philosophers and sociologists are concerned with certainty, but they mean different things
by it. Philosophers ask how one can be certain of something: What are the proper, appropriate
grounds for certainty? Sociologists ask what causes people to be certain of something in a particular situation: What criteria do people use to assure them of certainty, to accept something as a
fact? The question of how knowledge claims are evaluated is not the normative one of how
knowledge claims should be evaluated, as it is for epistemologists, but rather an empirical one of
how people in a given context actually go about evaluating or justifying a knowledge claim.
Clearly, traditional epistemologists and sociologists mean two different things by the word
“knowledge.” More specifically, the standard for acceptability as knowledge is far lower for sociology than it is for epistemology. Since constructivist sociologists consider knowledge to be
any belief one can justify, uphold, and share, where, if at all, does the sociologist draw the line
between knowledge and belief? While sociologists have succeeded (in the view of many) in cast-
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ing doubt on the notion of objective knowledge and have shown how knowledge itself is socially
constructed, traditional epistemologists can justifiably brush off all sociological work on “knowledge” that does not differentiate between logically or empirically verifiable beliefs and other
claims by saying “that’s not knowledge.” Indeed, advocates of more traditional epistemologies
have expressed annoyance at the sociologists’ fast and loose use of the word “knowledge” to describe logically and empirically unjustified beliefs in pointing out why truth matters (Benson &
Stangroom, 2006). The disagreement became a flashpoint in a “culture war” that that flared in
the 1990s, focused on issues of the validity of alternative perspectives and viewpoints and the
relativity of all knowledge as situated (see Gross & Levitt, 1994, Haraway, 1991).
The above discussion is not intended to suggest that sociologists are the ones arguing that whatever anyone thinks or asserts is knowledge while epistemologists hold on to more traditional notions of knowledge, accepting the reality of the existence of the external world and the validity of
the scientific method. These philosophical positions are not necessarily associated with the individual disciplines of philosophy and sociology. For example, John R. Searle (1995), renowned
for his books on the philosophy of mind and language, has advanced a moderate version of social
constructivism carefully differentiating between institutional facts that rely on consensus and
brute facts that are true whether or not humans know or accept them.
As early as the 1940s, the insights raised by the sociologists had caught the attention of a traditional philosopher, Arthur Child (1941, 1947), who, though not specifically an epistemologist,
labored to reconcile sociological and philosophical concepts about knowledge, contrary to other
philosophers (e.g., Hinshaw, 1943) who saw only epistemological confusion in the sociology of
knowledge. Child’s work was soon followed by studies by sociologists such as Irving Horowitz
(1951/1961) and Jacques Maquet (1949/1951) also pondering a rapprochement between sociology and epistemology. These authors raised the prospect of a view of knowledge mutually compatible to social scientists and philosophers interested in the absolute foundations of knowledge
that could yield cooperation and collaboration.
Some contemplated transcending sociology to create a new science of knowledge. One could
even suggest that sociologists considered challenging philosophy’s dominance as the leading discipline studying knowledge. As early as 1940, the Polish sociologist Florian Znaniecki
(1940/1970, p. 308) bemoaned the term “sociology of knowledge” as “unfortunate,” since “systems of knowledge, or theories . . . , are obviously not social systems.” What was needed, he
thought, was a “fully constituted ‘science of knowledge’” parallel to sociology and linguistics,
which could inductively analyze and compare systems of knowledge both historical and presentday, viewing them as empirical realities.

Shera’s Social Epistemology
Such ideas were also on the mind of Jesse H. Shera, a leading LIS educator who, in the 1950s,
began planning a new science of knowledge. Over several publications, he developed the notion
of social epistemology (crediting the term’s coinage to his early co-author Margaret Egan) to refer to a proposed new venture, distinct from the sociology of knowledge and dedicated to “the
study of those processes by which society as a whole seeks to achieve a perceptive or understanding relation to the total environment—physical, psychological, and intellectual” (Egan & Shera,
1952, p. 132). Social epistemology was intended to create a needed “framework for the investigation of the entire complex problem of the nature of the intellectual process in society” (Shera,
1972, p. 112). Equally, it was intended:
to lift the study of intellectual life from that of a scrutiny of the individual to an inquiry
into the means by which a society, nation, or culture achieves understanding of the totality of stimuli that act upon it. The focus of this new discipline should be upon the pro-
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duction, flow, integration, and consumption of all forms of communicated thought
throughout the entire social fabric. (Shera, 1972, p. 112)
Perhaps Shera hoped to surpass or usurp the sociology of knowledge and co-opt it into his own
agenda, since he envisioned social epistemology to be “truly interdisciplinary,” drawing on “sociology, anthropology, linguistics, economics, the physiology of the human nervous system, psychology, mathematics, and information theory, to name but a few of the most conspicuous areas”
(1972., p. 113). Although he aimed at a scientific study of knowledge, Shera denied that social
epistemology was a social science, and his approach to knowledge should probably be considered
humanistic, following in the tradition of literary and philosophical scholarship rather than a social
science research model. The latter requires the researcher to take into account concepts about
populations, units of analysis, data acquisition procedures, and metrics. The different general
approaches to knowledge in humanities and social science disciplines, as described by the educational psychologist J. G. Donald (1986), illuminate the predicament Shera faced in wanting to use
humanistic paradigms and methodologies (such as they are) to process social science materials.
Donald refers to studies by Dorothy Ross (1979) and Laurence Veysey (1979) on the development of social sciences and humanities scholarly professions in the context of the evolving
American university and Harry Broudy’s (1977) essay on types of knowing. She observes, “Because the humanistic disciplines are concerned with phenomena that do not have immediate referents, humanistic truth involves something other than scientific validity . . . . The emphasis
placed on original or divergent thinking leaves truth dependent upon individual critical judgments” (Donald, 1986, p. 276). As already mentioned, the social sciences have a humanistic heritage, but social scientists “appear to have a particular opportunity for validation through general
agreement . . . . The models which social scientists create can be tested and verified and their
logical structure can therefore be defined or at least represented” (Donald, 1986, p. 276.).
Social epistemology’s primary object of study was knowledge, not society; nor was social epistemology a behavioral science. In differentiating social epistemology from sociology, Shera
noted that the sociologists “have directed their attention toward the behavior of men in groups,
[but] have paid scant heed to the intellectual forces that shape social structures and institutions”
(Shera, 1972, p. 112). Shera wanted social epistemology to fill a gap by providing a perspective
obverse to that of the sociology of knowledge. Though he referred to social epistemology as a
new discipline, he clearly viewed it as the epistemological foundation for the superordinate discipline of LIS, which was open to social science concepts and methodologies.
John M. Budd (2002), who has critically analyzed Shera’s contributions on the subject, finds that
Shera did not exclude any assertion or claim as being knowledge. He is unconvinced by Shera’s
denial that social epistemology shares sociology’s permissive view of knowledge. According to
such a view, mere affirmations of truth, and not just those affirmations that are independently
true, justified, and verifiable, count as knowledge. Finding that Shera accepted sociology’s view
of the extent of knowledge, despite claims to the contrary, Budd appears to conclude that Shera’s
vision for social epistemology puts too much emphasis on the sociological perspective. Budd’s
analysis raises the concern that in trying to strike a middle course in approaching a problem as
complex as knowledge from multiple angles, a preference for any given disciplinary approach is
bound to appear limited or biased to those who do not share that perspective.

Disciplinarity as a Problem
Shera’s program for an interdisciplinary synthesis of approaches in studying knowledge, and the
apparently irreconcilable differences in the epistemological and sociological approaches to
knowledge, bring into focus the subject of disciplinarity itself as a problem that needs to be examined in the context of how it shapes people’s outlook on knowledge (see Dabars, 2008; Klein,
1996; Messer-Davidow, Shumway, & Sylvan, 1993; Shumway & Messer-Davidow, 1991;
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Turner, 2000). The disciplines, as both intellectual and social constructs, are pillars in the organization of the academy and in the literature. As such, disciplinarity, which may be defined as the
compartmentalization of scholarly research, labor, and communication into bureaucratic units, is
crucial in understanding the organization of knowledge, especially as it relates to higher education and the cultural record.
At the most obvious level, the disciplines confer institutional identity in an organization in terms
of a departmental address and expectations in terms of curricular responsibilities. At a deeper
level, part of what defines a discipline is how it approaches or relates to knowledge, including
what it accepts as knowledge, and where it draws a line beyond which it does not admit something as proper knowledge. In looking at knowledge, the different disciplines disagree on which
points are crucial and which are inconsequential, and they emphasize different processes of
knowledge validation. Education scholar Janet G. Donald (1995, p. 7) asserts that “the method
by which knowledge is arrived at in a discipline, its process of validation, and the truth criteria
employed in that process are essential to the definition of the discipline.” Each discipline will
only see a small part of a larger picture.
A matrix of disciplines has evolved, carving up intellectual spaces into curricular and bureaucratic domains, with specific methodologies, paradigms and other conceptual toolboxes, and inherited problem areas. These disciplines maintain their legitimacy through inertia and may not be
fit to tackle problems that have recently arrived on the horizon (Wallerstein, 2004). The major
mode of adaptation of disciplines is subdivision into smaller specialties (Becher, 1989).
A discipline, according to Michael Finkenthal (2001, pp. 4-5), “is more than a field of intellectual
endeavor defined by the object of research. It also implies the ability to transfer knowledge in an
‘objective’ way, that is, in such a way that anybody in possession of certain tools can understand
it, anywhere and at any time. That is because within a discipline meaning is conserved.” One’s
overall way of thinking is constrained by what Finkenthal (2001, p. 3), calls disciplinarian thinking. Disciplinarian thinking can lead to disciplines becoming “separate domains of discourse,
largely ‘walled off’ from connections to and feedback from outsiders” (Kline, 1995, p. 198). This
enclosure leads to a sense of territoriality about which topics and approaches are the rightful
property of a discipline, as well as a loose hierarchy of priorities, with some topics considered
unfit for consideration. The parameters and objectives of disciplines are often determined by professors at major Ph.D.-granting universities who have written programmatic statements (Townsend, 2013). Success and recognition depend on achievements pertinent to the goals and values
of one’s own discipline as defined by core texts. Any accomplishments outside one’s discipline’s
perceived mission could raise questions about a scholar’s interests and loyalties and could cause
the scholar not to receive full credit for his or her work.
Disciplinarity, besides providing institutional identity, lends one an affiliation at a deeper level of
identity as a scholar (see Messer-Davidow et al., 1993). Each discipline has its own intellectual
rubric that one acquires through study, training, research, and mentoring. By receiving certification, publishing, receiving employment in, and teaching a discipline, one gradually comes to internalize disciplinarity by viewing one’s own professional identity in terms of membership in the
discipline. Disciplinary thinking can become pervasive when one starts viewing and speaking
about everyday matters in terms of disciplinary concepts and priorities.
The need to affiliate and identify has long been recognized as a basic psychological drive, especially among those who yearn for achievement and acclaim (McClelland, 1953). There can be
significant psychic investment in disciplinary affiliation (Shumway, 2003); one gains a sense of
self-worth and fulfillment by identifying with a discipline. In modern academia, scholars view
their discipline more than the institutions that employ them as the source of their affiliation and
professional identity (Anderson & Murray, 1971). The separate discursive spaces produced by
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disciplines result in insularity, which has drawbacks but which can also result in the “the creation
of new problems and solutions, new materials and tools, new texts and new interpretations that
would not be produced by society at large” (Shumway, 2003, p. 98).

Social Epistemology and Disciplinarity
Shera, a mid-twentieth century library educator liminally situated betwixt and between the major
academic disciplines, proposed an interdisciplinary science of knowledge out of dissatisfaction
with the shortcomings he perceived in the approaches to knowledge endemic in existing disciplines. It appears that the very phenomenon of disciplinarity—the division of research into disciplines each with their own personnel—led to the predicament to which Shera (1972; Egan &
Shera, 1952) proposed social epistemology as the solution. Moreover, his concern was similar to
that voiced earlier by Znaniecki (1940/1970): There was no science of knowledge—not a sociology of knowledge predicated on the conceptual framework of sociology (involving social action,
socialization, social institutions, etc.), but an entirely separate discipline in which knowledge was
the focus, and in which conceptual frameworks adopted specifically for the study of knowledge
could be devised. As an LIS educator, Shera prioritized the graphic record rather than other
forms of communication. Approaches in the evolving mix of librarianship, or library science,
bibliography, documentation, and information science that over time converged as LIS (see Rayward, 1983), would, Shera anticipated, pave the way for progress in social epistemology.
Social epistemology was a response to a gap in the literature in the approach to knowledge by the
epistemologists and the sociologists. Similar gaps had also been noticed by Donald T. Campbell
(1969) in another early critique of disciplinarity, which theorized that the individual disciplines
were “arbitrary composites” and warned of a “redundant piling up of highly similar specialties,
leaving interdisciplinary gaps” (p. 328.). Characterizing the disciplines as “ethnocentric,” he was
an early writer to call attention to the parochialism and chauvinism of disciplinary thinking,
which can lead to a hall of mirrors effect in which scientists compare their work only to others
who share the same frame of reference. While interdisciplinary cooperation and planning was
common in universities by the 1950s, recognition of the limitations of disciplinarity was only beginning to emerge in Shera’s time.
Shera’s social epistemology, devised as a new way of approaching knowledge, was one of a few
projects attempting to circumvent and transcend disciplinarity in tackling a subject that, because
of its unique position, could not be handled by a single discipline—neither philosophy, nor sociology, nor any other discipline in existence. Shera’s home discipline, library science, provided a
different angle from philosophy and sociology that offered an intriguing viewpoint as an applied
discipline focused on the selection, acquisition, description, organization, management, and provision of access to documents on all subjects for research, study, inquiry, or other purposes.
Shera framed his work in the context of education for librarians as providing a conceptual basis
for research, teaching, and thinking in that profession. At the same time, he wanted social epistemology to affect the thought of scholars and intellectuals more generally, outside the library
profession. But few people then or later seriously thought that library (and information) science
was central to debates about knowledge, even if they agreed that concepts of and practices surrounding knowledge are at the core of library work and the raison d’être of the library as an institution. (On the curious relationship between theory and practice in LIS see Carlin, 2009).
Although Shera had the audacity to name his approach social epistemology and proclaim it a new
discipline, he did not pursue the subject further by writing an extended text on it after he had
opened up the ground for it. Shera and his social epistemology were recognized by scholars in the
LIS field but made so little impact outside that field that when the term was reintroduced after his
death by philosophers (most notably Steve Fuller and Alvin Goldman), the authors were initially
unaware that the term had ever been used before in the literature (Zandonade, 2004). Fuller and
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Goldman have since gone on to prominence developing their own schools of thought regarding
social epistemology and have meant somewhat different things by it. They even founded dueling
journals, Social Epistemology and Episteme. Ironically, the fate of Shera’s social epistemology
would itself make for an interesting case study in social epistemology. Nevertheless, Shera’s
awareness of the need for a new discipline about knowledge can be seen as the beginning of a
new kind of approach to knowledge, one that does not merely combine existing disciplinary approaches in focusing on a problem but that attempts, however unsuccessfully (Budd, 2002, 2004),
to reconstruct the study of knowledge by thinking outside the limits of all disciplinary perspectives. In a sense, his social epistemology was transdisciplinary before there was a word for it.

Transdisciplinarity
The first recorded use of the word “transdisciplinarity” occurred in a seminar on interdisciplinarity in universities held in 1970 at the University of Nice and sponsored by the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development in collaboration with the French Ministry of Education
(Jantsch, 1972a, 1972b; Klein, 2000b). The Austrian astrophysicist Erich Jantsch provided the
word’s first definition as “the co-ordination of all disciplines and interdisciplines in an education/innovation system on the basis of a generalized axiomatic (introduced from the purposive
level down) and emerging epistemological (‘synepistemic’) pattern” (Jantsch, 1972b, p. 106).
The term rarely appeared in the literature until 1994 when the First World Congress of Transdisciplinarity was convened at Convento de Arrábida, Portugal. The congress resulted in the adoption of the Charter of Transdisciplinarity (http://ciret-transdisciplinarity.org/chart.php) edited by
Lima de Freitas, Edgar Morin, and Basarab Nicolescu. That year also saw the publication of The
New Production of Knowledge (Gibbons et al., 1994). In this landmark text, Michael Gibbons
and his collaborators Camille Limoges, Helga Nowotny, Peter Scott, Simon Schwartz, and Martin
Trow (1994) introduced readers to a new vocabulary focused on the idea of context of application, defined, as it pertains to research, as “problem solving and the generation of knowledge organised around a particular application . . . [including] the milieu of interests, institutions, and
practices, which impinge on the problem to be solved” (p. 167). Transdisciplinarity then was defined by the authors as “knowledge which emerges from a particular context of application with
its own distinct theoretical structures, research methods, and modes of practice but which may not
be locatable on the prevailing disciplinary map” (p. 168). With the publication of the Gibbons et
al. text and the Charter of Transdisciplinarity, interest in transdisciplinarity has burgeoned as an
educational approach related mainly to socially responsible science and technology (see Somerville & Rapport, 2000).
Transdisciplinarity is best understood as a subcategory of the more inclusive interdisciplinarity
that has branched off and developed its own rhetoric (Klein, 2009). This rhetoric can easily be
read to suggest that transdisciplinarity represents an utterly novel approach heralding a complete
break from all previous disciplinary thinking and organization of research and pedagogy. However, its roots can be seen in the writings of various earlier scholars. This essay explores some of
these roots in detail by focusing on a few key individuals, but others have anticipated parts of the
transdisciplinary agenda.
Transdisciplinary research involves work in both academic and nonacademic settings and it includes the inputs of participants or subjects of studies on an equal footing with those of investigators. Topics described as being too complex for disciplinary or even interdisciplinary research,
ranging from global climate change to nanotechnology, to peace and conflict, have been seen as
suited to transdisciplinary research. Indeed, complexity itself is a key issue and criterion in transdisciplinary research (Nowotny, Scott, & Gibbons, 2001; Somerville & Rapport, 2000; see also
Bunge, 2003; Taylor, 2001). Mechatronics, which combines mechanics and electronics, exemplifies the innovative approach needed in transdisciplinary research and education (Pop & Mathies,
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2008). Other key topics in transdisciplinarity include systems thinking, hearkening back to the
ideas of Ludwig von Bertalanffy, Kenneth Boulding, and C. West Churchman (Strijbos, 2010),
and evaluation (Huutoniemi, 2010).
The definition of transdisciplinarity compared with interdisciplinarity and multidisciplinarity is
the subject of a recent paper by David Alvargonzález (2011), which reviews the extensive literature on the subject. Citing Julie Thompson Klein (2010, p. 16), he says that multidisciplinarity
involves mere “additive juxtaposition” of different disciplines, resulting in “pseudointerdisciplinarity,” while “true interdisciplinarity is interacting, linking, and focusing.” Transdisciplinarity, in contrast to both of these, is “transcending, transgressing, and transforming, it is
critical, integrative, and restructuring, but, as a consequence of that, it is also broader and more
exogenous” (Alvargonzález, 2011, pp. 388-389). But neither author mentions Stephen Jay Kline,
who wrote that “multidisciplinary study examines the appropriate relations of the disciplines to
each other and to the larger intellectual terrain” (Kline, 1995, p. 2). With the potential for confusion from such hair-splitting and terminological variation, it is understandable that Maria LópezHuertas (2013) groups all the new combinations of disciplines together as “multidimensional
knowledge,” a way of thinking about knowledge that is in a sense post-disciplinary and postepistemological, and that is gathering momentum. Despite possible confusion among the somewhat overlapping terms, López-Huertas does not consider any of them redundant. The term
“transdisciplinarity” makes a useful distinction and is retained here.
While ordinary interdisciplinarity analyzes, synthesizes, and harmonizes links between disciplines into a coordinated and coherent whole, transdisciplinarity seeks to reconstruct knowledge
from scratch, recombining the content knowledge of the disciplines into new formations with an
aim of recognizing and analyzing all relevant angles on a problem and their dimensions of reality
(see Madni, 2007, Pop & Maties, 2008, Wallerstein, 2004). As noted by Alvargonzález (2011, p.
388), the word “transdisciplinarity” connotes in its etymology “going across and through the disciplines, and beyond each individual discipline.” Such an approach questions the fundamental
assumptions behind the segmentation of knowledge into disciplines.
Transdisciplinarity, in other words, results from a growing recognition among scientists, scholars,
and educators of the limitations and distorted priorities of disciplinary thinking. By applying the
term “transdisciplinarity” rather than ordinary “interdisciplinarity” to the study of knowledge, I
am suggesting that such work transcends disciplinarity by challenging disciplinarity itself and the
entire framework of disciplinarian thinking, assembling a new approach from the ground up using
the materials of earlier discipline-based studies. The study of knowledge is suited to a transdisciplinary approach not only because of the changing social, economic, and political framework of
knowledge production in advanced societies seized on by Gibbons et al. (1994) as signaling a
break from the past but because of the unique position of knowledge in relation to all subjects and
the need to consider multiple dimensions and angles. Depending on one’s definitions, dimensions could include the psychological, the epistemic, the social, and the cultural; the angles would
include the idealistic (or analytical), the semantic (or lexical), the bibliographical, the serviceoriented, and the results-oriented.
As a quickly evolving notion, much literature useful in understanding transdisciplinary tendencies
maintains the older term “interdisciplinary,” or even, as in the case of Kline (1995), “multidisciplinary,” and this terminological variation could be a source of confusion in differentiating among
them. Kline’s work seems highly pertinent to transdisciplinarity, as it describes concepts of hierarchy, complexity, and dimensionality to explain categories of disciplines and the relationships
among them. The analytic features described by Kline as fundamental to multidisciplinary thinking have their mathematical basis in category theory (Ehresmann & Vanbremeersch, 2007;
Goguen, 1999). Nevertheless, the chief writers associated with transdisciplinary theory have not
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cited him, and one wonders what role his choice of terminology played in the absence of discussions of his work by transdisciplinarians.
The same can be said of Mario Bunge’s book, Emergence and Convergence (2003), which analyzes disciplinarity, cross-disciplinarity, multidisciplinarity, and interdisciplinarity, but not transdisciplinarity. Bunge has diagnosed problems of reductionism, fragmentation, and theoretical
shallowness in the standard work of the disciplines and has proposed solutions for crossdisciplinary integration. Bunge writes about emergence and convergence as they relate to complexity, issues one might expect would interest those involved with developing transdisciplinary
research. Like Kline’s text, Bunge’s work has yet to be recognized in the literature on the subject, and one must consider the possibility that his failure to use the specific buzzword “transdisciplinarity” has led to this lack of awareness or inclusion. Mark C. Taylor is yet another recent
author whose work deserves to be considered by the transdisciplinarians. Though his book The
Moment of Complexity (2001) does not specifically discuss disciplinarity or its variations, like
Bunge, he explores emergence, evolution, and other topics pertinent to the study of complexity,
information, knowledge, and education.
According to López-Huertas (2013), transdisciplinarity is guided by the demands and conditions
of post-Cold War, networked, neo-liberal society, which are very different from those pertinent to
the post-World War II period of the authors under discussion. By applying the term to Shera and
other authors whose writings on knowledge span the years from 1952 to 1984, I mean to suggest
only that the roots of a transdisciplinary approach to knowledge are apparent in their works. In
advocating transdisciplinary thinking, I want to encourage students and scholars to imagine new
possibilities for thinking about, studying, and researching knowledge. However, I do not claim
that it is desirable to do away with any existing disciplines. I agree with Joe Moran’s statement
(cited by Repko, 2012, p. 35) that “we can never entirely dispense with the disciplines as a means
of organizing knowledge . . . but we can use them to create new intellectual configurations of
knowledge.”

Machlup and Polanyi
In the long run, Shera’s reputation remained specific to LIS. But in his time (1903-1982), two
other scholars of global renown—Fritz Machlup (1902-1983) and Michael Polanyi (18911976)—independently pursued what I suggest can retrospectively be called the beginnings of a
transdisciplinary approach to knowledge. Shera’s essay, “An Epistemological Foundation for
Library and Information Science,” was first presented at a conference in 1965 and was published
in 1968 before it was reprinted as a chapter in his 1972 book, The Foundations of Education for
Librarianship. In it he cites the works of Machlup and Polanyi with a mixture of praise and criticism, naming The Production and Distribution of Knowledge in the United States (Machlup,
1962) as one of only two books “aimed in the direction of providing a foundation for the kind of
discipline indicated here” (Shera, 1972, p. 112).
Before leaving Shera to discuss these authors, one ought to observe that while Shera could be accused of grandiosity in naming his approach social epistemology (even though he refused credit
for coining the term) and calling it a new discipline, Polanyi, who subtitled his major book Towards a Post-critical Philosophy (1958), was (perhaps) slightly less pretentious, while Machlup
did not give a name to his own approach. Shera criticized Polanyi’s psychologized, individualistic notion of knowledge as part of an entire prevailing approach to knowledge he hoped to replace. Polanyi did not respond to this mild criticism and may not have been aware of it. But
Shera and Machlup did cross paths. In an odd coincidence, Shera’s last paper, submitted only
months before his death in 1982, was a contribution to a project organized by Machlup in connection with a book he was planning as part of his series on knowledge, to be called The Disciplines
of Information. Machlup himself died not long afterward, before the project could be completed,
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and the book was released as The Study of Information: Interdisciplinary Messages (Machlup &
Mansfield, 1983). Shera’s (1983) chapter on the relationship between librarianship and information science is strikingly negative and gloomy in tone, and it does not even mention social epistemology, but rather recommends social interactionism, a sociological theory associated with
George Herbert Mead, an early and influential social psychologist (see Wright, 1998).
Fritz Machlup and Michael Polanyi were both scholars trained in old world European traditions,
assimilated Jews who escaped the Nazi terror on the continent by emigrating to English-speaking
countries in 1933, and both went on to have illustrious careers as eminent professors in their areas
of expertise. (Polanyi later converted to Christianity and is highly esteemed by Christian theologians.) Both crossed the boundaries of their home disciplines when they turned their attention in
their later years to the study of knowledge, writing numerous substantial works on the subject.
As in the Tom Stoppard play Travesties, about a fictional meeting between James Joyce, Vladimir Lenin, and the Dadaist writer Tristan Tzara, one can imagine a meeting between these contemporaries who were luminaries in their own circles, but there is no evidence of any actual contact between them. Machlup, who assiduously surveyed the research literature, cited Polanyi in
passing, while Polanyi, who worked on the foundations of knowledge as they relate to individual
discovery, had no reason to absorb or respond to Machlup’s socioeconomic studies and had
passed away by the time Machlup produced his final, more holistic syntheses.
Machlup’s professional interest in knowledge as a subject began with questions about patents as a
restriction on competition. At first, his focus on knowledge appeared to be but one thread in a
distinguished career as an economist that included not only professorships but a consultancy to
the US Treasury. His book on the economics of knowledge (Machlup, 1962) went beyond traditional concerns about knowledge as a factor in consumer choices, preferences, and decision making and led to research about an entire sector of the economy devoted to knowledge, and it had
major implications for understanding post-World War II civilization. Most importantly, by identifying a shift in the US economy from one focused on the manufacture of physical objects to one
in which knowledge production was central, Machlup’s work inspired influential books on postindustrial or information age society by the sociologist Daniel Bell (1973), the management guru
Peter Drucker (1969), and the futurist author Alvin Toffler (1970).
Machlup began articulating a typology of the kinds and qualities of knowledge that has been recognized (not least of all by Shera, 1972) as one of his greatest insights (cf. Miksa, 1985, Wallace,
2007). He was also among the first to consider the relations between data, information, and
knowledge, though some (again, including Shera) chastised him for failing to differentiate clearly
between knowledge and information (but see Machlup, 1983). Machlup’s research on knowledge
carried over to the four-volume Information through the Printed Word (Machlup & Leeson,
1978-1980), and finally to the magnum opus, Knowledge: Its Creation, Distribution, and Economic Significance (1980-1984), intended to comprehend all categories, aspects, and qualities of
knowledge and its analysis. An extremely ambitious undertaking under any circumstances given
the complexity, elusiveness, and all-encompassing qualities of knowledge as a subject, it is even
more remarkable when one considers that Machlup was 77 when the first volume appeared. The
project was originally conceived as eight volumes, but while working on it Machlup determined
that the subject required two more volumes than he had first planned. Given his advanced age, it
could not have shocked anyone greatly that the project was unfinished at the time of his death,
ending up finally with three single-authored volumes plus a co-edited volume encompassing the
subject matter of what was to be Volume 4.
This work is most significant in viewing Machlup’s contribution to transdisciplinarity, or at least
its groundwork. Indeed, Machlup (1980, pp. 21-22) explicitly describes the work as transdisciplinary and acknowledges that it does not satisfy the expectations of specialists who would have
preferred his work to be about knowledge as it is specifically seen in economics, the natural sci-
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ences, library (and information) science, or philosophy, as the case may be. The term “transdisciplinary” had only recently been coined and was not yet in common use in 1980, and while
Machlup does not elaborate on what he means by using the term along with the more common
“interdisciplinary,” his work does capture the nascent transdisciplinary spirit, since it moves far
beyond the economic questions that first prompted him to focus on questions of knowledge.
Economics was only his entry point into the study of knowledge and provided intellectual
grounding. From there, he moved outside economics by using all the tools at the scholar’s disposal to explain knowledge not only as an economic phenomenon but also from every other valid
angle—cultural, sociological, linguistic, psychological, etc. He brought together the insights
from all disciplines as well as from his own thought experiments, an approach borrowed from
analytic philosophy. But although knowledge on the whole is thought of as a philosophical problem, Machlup’s approach was not properly philosophical, since he did not define knowledge in
any analytical way. Instead, he incorporated the inputs of various disciplines, approaching his
topic of knowledge as one would a more ordinary topic.
Machlup drew a crucial distinction between the two meanings of knowledge: the process of
knowing and that which is known. His lasting contribution to our understanding of knowledge
concerns the second meaning. Like the sociologists, Machlup advocated an open concept of
knowledge and defined it as whatever people thought was knowledge, without reference to criteria of truth, justification, or evidence. His view of knowledge does not pass muster in disciplines
that demand absolute verifiability, logical consistency, measurability, accuracy, and avoidance of
error. Philosophers were not satisfied with his study and do not frequently cite it. Yet his work
was not properly sociological either, and sociologists did not give it a warmer reception than did
the philosophers. Like Shera, he appears to have sought to reach beyond both philosophy and
sociology. As a conceptual framework for thinking about knowledge, Machlup’s approach, like
Shera’s, seems most congenial to that of library science in that libraries need exacting standards
for bibliographical description and yet cannot not be so rigid about truth claims as to block access
to materials. His approach to viewing knowledge as a broad cultural phenomenon and defining
characteristic of civilization lives on in works such as Peter Burke’s A Social History of Knowledge (2000-2012).
It would be almost as accurate to say that Machlup used no disciplinary foundation as to say that
he incorporated all relevant disciplines. His work opened a door to transdisciplinarity, and to the
extent that it failed it was because he could not successfully reimagine the disciplines (see Castan
Broto, Gislason, & Ehlers, 2009). Volume 2, The Branches of Learning (Machlup, 1982), describes the organization of disciplines as part of the historical development of universities, along
with a description of classification systems in libraries, reference books, and academies of sciences. But beyond bringing these diverse domains of knowledge organization together in a fairly
standard historical account, Machlup does not interpret the arrangement of disciplines or subjects
and their interplay as an intellectual phenomenon in a way later scholars would. He helped lay
the groundwork for the more probing work into the nature of disciplines and other knowledge
organizing structures that we find in later writings by such authors as Francis Miksa (1998) and
Fred D’Agostino (2012), along with the aforementioned Julie Thompson Klein (1996). Yet the
fact that he undertook this exercise suggests he was building toward a later grand synthesis. His
most lasting transdisciplinary insight about the five classes of knowledge (practical knowledge;
intellectual knowledge; small-talk and pastime knowledge; spiritual knowledge; and unwanted
knowledge) had already been introduced in his 1962 book, and his final book series, though respected by many, satisfied neither epistemologists nor social scientists and did not spur others to
follow in his path. By contrast, the French scholar Michel Foucault (1926-1984), author of The
Archaeology of Knowledge (1969/1972) and Power/Knowledge (1980) among many other books,
inspired an international cult-like following among scholars and students in a multitude of disci-
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plines. Foucault’s devotees have not only canonized his work but picked up where he left off (see
Halperin, 1995).
Michael Polanyi’s magnum opus, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-critical Philosophy
(1958), preceded Machlup’s work on knowledge, but it can be usefully seen as a proleptic answer
to him, since Polanyi does not look at knowledge as an external phenomenon that must be apprehended by humans, but rather begins with the outlook of the individual inquirer or learner.
Machlup and Polanyi both focused on knowledge production, but while Machlup concentrated on
the socioeconomic sense of “production,” Polanyi meant something else altogether and introduced an original approach to knowing in terms of the individual’s subjective experience of encountering the external world through inquiry, resulting in discoveries. Polanyi saw knowing as
an active comprehension of the things known, an action that requires skill. Whereas Machlup,
whose works postdate those of Polanyi, took into account his predecessor’s approach as describing an aspect of the larger phenomenon of the totality of knowledge, for Polanyi, knowing at the
personal level was primary.
While Machlup looked at knowledge as the achievement of civilization, Polanyi focused on the
process of knowing from an internal point of view. He looked at understanding, or making sense,
as grasping and integrating information to make it knowledge. Consideration of knowing requires a theory of the relationship between the knowing subject and the known object. It includes
multiple kinds of knowing, down to sensory perception.
Polanyi trained as a medical doctor before beginning his scientific career as a physical chemist
and achieved great distinction before changing his field of interest in his fifties to the social sciences, working at first on labor and employment. But he soon became occupied with big picture
questions about scientific knowledge, discovery, and inquiry. His writing about these subjects
was prompted by his own experiences as a laboratory scientist. His writings on knowledge cite
the major modern philosophers, and his work is recognizable as philosophy. (Personal Knowledge (Polanyi, 1958) originated as Polanyi’s Gifford Lectures presented at the University of Aberdeen during the 1951-52 academic year. The Gifford Lectures, in existence since 1888, is one
of the world’s most prestigious lecture series on religion, science, and philosophy; see
www.giffordlectures.org.) But what is most striking is that he skips past the topics that have traditionally dominated philosophical epistemology and writes about the personal engagement with
the world that characterizes discovery. Polanyi prioritizes the interests, motives, emotions, and
thought paths of the individual knower or inquirer. For him, knowledge is acquired through engaged inquiry, through passion and commitment. The inquirer in his view need not be a professional, skilled, or certified expert but could be anyone—a student or even an interested layman.
Polanyi’s experience as a physical chemist taught him that the rigor of scientific procedure was
“secondary to the role of the creative imagination. Scientific work cannot be carried out by mere
following of rules” (Gelwick, 1977, p. 26). Scientific research requires insight and judgment that
surpass method. The difference between conformist research and discovery lies in the personal
judgment of the scientist. Polanyi propounded an image of the scientist that was unusual for its
time. Rather than portraying the scientist as impersonal, detached, and obsessed with precision
and methodology, he idealized an image of the committed engaged scientist on a quest for discovery. For Polanyi, creative thinking in science was akin to art. Polanyi’s biographer Richard
Gelwick (1977, pp. 47-48) asserted that the approach to knowledge detailed in Personal Knowledge was a not a correction of modern philosophy but a “truly alternative ideal of knowledge,”
inasmuch as it represents the personal background of the inquirer not as “a hindering factor but
the intelligent center of knowledge.”
Polanyi’s personalistic, almost phenomenological view of the knowledge creation process represented an individualistic approach to knowledge of the kind rejected by Shera, yet it is an essen-
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tial counterweight to the view of knowledge as socially conditioned. More important here is that
it extends a view about the nature, value, creation, and development of knowledge in ways that
can stimulate research and teaching that challenges conventional thinking about knowledge associated with traditional disciplines.
While Polanyi considered the individual scientist making discoveries through the observation of
nature, such an approach can be applied, for example, to inquiries using scholarly resources, to
hobbies, or even to the inquiries of a completely untrained person. The nearly dialectical tension
between Machlup’s study of knowledge as an artifact and Polanyi’s work on knowing anticipates
Nicolescu’s (2012) concern for transdisciplinary research not to reduce the subject to the object or
vice versa (cf. López-Huertas, 2013).
Polanyi drew on theories from Gestalt psychology rather than information theory or the sociology
of knowledge in analyzing the process whereby inquirers integrated particular details from various sources and kinds of evidence into a single meaningful pattern. This approach to knowing
from the inside anticipates Abraham Maslow’s (1966) work on positive psychology and Mihaly
Csikszentmahalyi’s (1990) work on flow. It is even phenomenological in that it refers to bodily
awareness and practices, including attention, sensory perception, and involuntary movement of
the muscles (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962).
Another significant connection in Polanyi’s oeuvre is to F. A. (Friedrich) Hayek, a Nobel Prizewinning economist who preceded Machlup in studying the economics of knowledge (Hayek,
1945). A lifelong friendship developed between Polanyi and Hayek over shared scholarly interests along with the fact that both men were distressed about the “threat of scientific Marxism, the
spectre of socialism it was casting over Europe, and its implications for the future progress of an
autonomous science” (Fischer & Mandel, 2009, p. 28). In a paper first published in a festschrift
for Karl Popper, Hayek (1964) seems to reiterate Polanyi’s emphasis on pattern recognition as
key to scientific knowledge, though he does not mention him by name. This essay, along with
some others published in the 1967 collection, Studies in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics,
especially “The Dilemma of Specialization” (originally 1956), suggest Hayek’s own gravitation
toward incipient transdisciplinary thinking about knowledge. Hayek’s work points to a long genealogy to the approach epitomized by Polanyi in Personal Knowledge, since he (Hayek, 1964, p.
322) cites the eighteenth century Scottish philosopher Adam Smith as having made similar observations to Polanyi’s about the role of wonder and the pursuit of study for its own sake rather than
the “expectation of advantages” being key to scientific inquiry and discovery.
Polanyi has been the subject of several critical studies and he continues to have a cult-like following among loyalist philosophers, some of whom congregate annually for conferences of the Polanyi Society. His ideas also reverberate in the writings of later thinkers such as Juri Lotman
(e.g., 2009) who, in terms similar to Polanyi’s, argued that scientific creativity is akin to artistic
creativity. But on the whole, Polanyi’s work was, and remains, generally out of touch with the
trends that have dominated the later philosophical and sociological study of knowledge and science. His humanistic, optimistic, even idealistic, view of the scientist stands in stark contrast to
the bleak, suspicious, and anti-humanistic outlook on science and even knowledge put forth by
many recent scholars, especially those associated with influential postmodernist and deconstructionist traditions (see, e.g., Blum, 1971; Foucault, 1969/1972; Lyotard, 1979/1984; Mourad,
1995; cf. J. H. Gill, 2000). Nor was knowledge for Polanyi a view from nowhere, depersonalized
and objective—a view assumed by most mainstream philosophers (Allen, 2004). Rather, knowledge in his view is pursued through inquiry and discovery, resulting from interest and curiosity,
which can legitimately be viewed as humane virtues.
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Knowledge Management: A Non-Liberal Arts Alternative
Polanyi’s interest in the interior mental spaces of knowing led him to identify and write at length
about something that became the greatest source of his afterlife: the notion of tacit knowledge,
referring to knowledge that cannot (easily) be articulated. His most commonly cited example of
tacit knowledge was knowledge of how to ride a bicycle (Polanyi, 1966). The term, as reintroduced by Ikojiro Nonaka and Hirotaka Takeuchi (1995), has become the cornerstone of an
emergent academic specialty, knowledge management (KM). Because of the popularization of
tacit knowledge first by Nonaka and Takeuchi and from them throughout the KM literature as a
whole, many people use the term “tacit knowledge” without knowing Polanyi’s name, much less
that he coined the expression. However, Nonaka and Takeuchi put a spin on the concept of tacit
knowledge that Polanyi never suggested (see Wallace, 2007, pp. 30-31) by using the term to describe the knowledge employees in organizations have in their heads that can lead to product improvements, if only it can be transformed into explicit knowledge. The concept of tacit knowledge is used in business modeling to develop ontologies composed of precise terms “exactifying”
and summarizing conceptual schemas underlying the tacit assumptions of organization members
with different viewpoints (Kilov & Sack, 2005). KM, therefore, is the toolbox of techniques intended to maximize the value and impact of employees’ knowledge by converting tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge, thereby making it actionable.
Although the KM literature is heavy with discussions about the definition of knowledge (especially in relation to information), Thomas Davenport and Laurence Prusak’s (1998) widely cited
definition of it as justified personal belief that increases an individual’s capacity to take effective
action is highly suggestive of the way the concept is used in that field. Knowledge, in this view,
is an economic product, a resource for the firm or organization, and “human capital,” a concept
Machlup (1984) expounded on in Volume 3 of his trilogy on knowledge. Knowledge managers
devise tools to capture workers’ knowledge and make it available to others in the firm so they can
use that knowledge to create better products or otherwise respond to market needs. In contrast to
philosophy and sociology (among many other disciplines), KM is an applied science, focused not
on intellectual enlightenment or the pure advancement of knowledge for its own sake but on results. Specifically, KM develops tools promoting the conversion, transmission, and sharing of
knowledge for the benefit of those with a stake in the particular organization, but not for the benefit of the public at large (which would include competitors).
The KM view of knowledge draws on the closely related fields of information science and cognitive science, relying on models of cognition as the processing of information (see Buckland,
1981; De May, 1982; Gleick, 2011; Kochen, 1974; Sowa, 1984). The notion of relating knowledge to information has it that knowledge builds on and synthesizes information, adding value
while at the same time refining and filtering it. It takes a great deal of information to get a small
amount of knowledge. This view of knowledge as processed information is quite different from
previous views of knowledge promoted in traditional humanities and liberal arts educational programs that idealized it as the product of learning and scholarship (see Leary, 1955). The new
view stems from the priorities of administration, which is an applied rather than a pure field. In
order to be managed, an individual’s knowledge must be elicited, codified, and transformed into a
sharable format, whether the product is called knowledge or information (McInerney, 2002, p.
1016). Knowledge is hard to specify, much less measure, but if it is described in terms of information it can be quantified, making it useful in administration for accounting and evaluation.
Unlike knowledge (a purely mental product), information can be measured as inputs and outputs.
Knowledge management takes a particular view of knowledge that may be contrasted with the
view in epistemology and the sociology of knowledge. Epistemology, working solely within the
realm of ideas, can be seen as the furthest from concerns about the real world outside academia or
the laboratory. The sociology of knowledge also deals with ideas and the relationships between
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them, but is oriented toward the real world in its concern with behaviors surrounding “knowledge” defined as a socially pervasive sense of certainty, whether or not it is epistemically justified. In contrast to both, KM is not concerned with the interplay of ideas as theories in the abstract but as they can be applied for real world solutions and results, especially in an organizational or business context.
Knowledge in KM is viewed as an asset that can and ought to be managed, a means to an end
rather than a good in its own right. It is not an absolute or ultimate objective but rather a quality
whose value and purpose must be justified. Not only does the meaning of knowledge need to be
put into a framework to make it accessible for use but its value to the organization must be assessed and managers must find the best way to deploy it for the betterment of the organization
and its stakeholders. A managerial approach to knowledge or any other asset in an organizational
context would seek to control it effectively, maximize its value, and extract that value from it.
Another way of looking at the service orientation of KM is to consider the closely related informing science framework of Eli B. Cohen (2009, p. 6), which emphasizes “provid[ing] one’s clientele with information in a form, format, and schedule that maximizes its effectiveness.” Cohen’s
notion of clientele encompasses not only business clients, but persons in many kinds of situations
ranging from library patrons to patients to owners of machinery who need information. Cohen
thus rejects the equation of a disciplinary concern with service to a client’s needs as a business or
even management orientation, and includes both KM and LIS (library and information science)
under the rubric of informing science. In particular, knowledge organization (KO), the branch of
library and information science that studies and develops taxonomies, classification systems, and
related forms of record organization and knowledge representation, is an informing science because it studies knowledge not in the abstract but for applied, pragmatic purposes (see Smiraglia,
2002). An example of the pragmatic orientation of library science is the cataloging rule stating
that works should be entered under the author’s name as it appears in the text, even if it is a pseudonym. The purist approach of entering the work under the author’s real name might be justifiable as more academically correct but it would likely hamper readers’ efforts in finding the
works.
Shera himself foreshadowed KM in 1961when he wrote that librarianship was fundamentally “the
management of knowledge.” With a theoretical grounding in social epistemology, “the very
foundations of the librarian’s theoretical knowledge,” librarianship could be a true profession, the
aim of which is “to maximize the social utility of graphic records, whether the patron is an unlettered child absorbed in his first picture book or an advanced scholar engaged in some esoteric
inquiry” (Shera, 1961, p. 770). Shera would likely have agreed with the suggestion that librarianship was an informing science: as befits a true profession (as opposed to a respectable trade), it
needed a theoretical basis, and the theory most important to librarianship was the theory of
knowledge. KO, which grew in part out of Shera’s theories of bibliography, likewise is involved
in developing systems to serve client needs, but it also has a purist side focusing on the structuring of knowledge through hierarchy, domains, resemblance, the semantics of taxonomy, and so
on. Ingetraut Dahlberg (2006), one of the founders of KO, maintains that it qualifies as a separate, objective science studying the structure and form of all sciences.
Looked at as a movement or approach to knowledge, KM poses an interesting challenge to the
purer scholarly disciplines. References in the KM literature to Machlup and especially Polanyi
(as well as many others who have written about knowledge) indicate that KM scholars have
worked through the relevant literature on knowledge originating outside the organizational and
managerial sciences themselves in developing their own approach (Alavi & Leidner, 2001, Martin, 2008). But they have repurposed their discussions and conclusions from purist educational
frameworks into a managerial framework and have added concerns for efficiency and a client
orientation that were absent in the original writings. While a purely academic subject like phi-
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losophy, and even applied disciplines like education and library science, might look at knowledge
as an unqualified good whose value cannot be questioned, KM asks what exactly is the benefit
gained from knowledge, and under what conditions. One wants the benefits, not necessarily the
knowledge.
In treating knowledge as a resource that needs to be elicited from knowledge workers for the
benefit of the firm rather than a good in its own right, the KM viewpoint seems contrary to an
educational or liberal arts viewpoint. In liberal arts, educational, or scholarly approaches, curiosity and interest motivate the quest for knowledge, and understanding and the development of
knowledge are the goals. Such an emphasis seems to be underscored in Polanyi’s writings. The
KM viewpoint is rather different, viewing knowledge as control over a system. The advent of a
view of knowledge that does not prioritize its intellectual value as an end in itself is not necessarily cause for worry to more purist educators or scholars, but one wonders if such an approach
loses sight of intellectual virtues and would like to find a common ground connecting KM with a
liberal arts agenda on fundamental issues, including the meaning and significance of knowledge.

The New Environment of Knowledge and Information
In retrospect, the period in which Shera, Machlup, and Polanyi worked represented the pinnacle
of success of academic science and scholarship. Academic man was at the height of his powers,
especially in the USA (Jencks & Riesman, 1968). (The use of the masculine pronoun for all academics exposes the prevailing consciousness of the times in taking for granted the significance
and even existence of distinct female academic voices. Such a usage would no longer be accepted on stylistic grounds, nor would it accurately reflect more recent institutional realities, as
Finkelstein, Seal, and Schuster’s 1998 work shows.) Since that time we have witnessed what Bill
Readings (1995) has called “the university in ruins,” when faith in the ability of the academy to
solve problems has declined, as has respect for scholars, scientists, and universities. Equally important, the prospects for the academic professions have been thrown in doubt as universities
have replaced traditional faculty-focused operating models with managerial ones governed by
bottom-line concerns (Dijkstra, 1994, Donoghue, 2008, Kirp, 2003, Waters, 2004). Knowledge
management represents a “real world” approach to the study of knowledge disconnected from the
purist aims of the academy, as we have seen. Gibbons et al. (1994), followed by Nowotny, Scott,
and Gibbons (2001), described a new system for the production of knowledge, called mode two
knowledge, in which universities are not so central or may be circumvented altogether as laboratories are created by industries or are government-supported but based off campus, bringing in
experts from multiple disciplines for specific projects. It was in this recent context that contemporary views about transdisciplinarity emerged.
The place of knowledge in the world at present cannot be described without taking into account
the revolutionary changes in communication and information use caused by the development and
popularization of information technology. The post-World War II environment, during the dawn
of the computer age, in which Shera and other LIS pioneers experimented with information retrieval systems (see Wright, 1998), is barely comprehensible to people today who take for granted
ubiquitous, round-the-clock access, availability, and findability.
Much has been written about changes in the ways people locate, browse, and read information as
a result of new technology (e.g., Cull, 2011, Rice, McCreadie, & Chang, 2001, Shoham, 2000,
Ulin, 2010). But knowledge is something different from information behavior, and it requires
different conceptual models and research strategies. Despite the complex interconnections between knowledge and information that make it possible in many cases to use the words interchangeably (Buckland, 1981), knowledge, unlike information, is a mental phenomenon and cannot be reduced to information. Knowledge and information have different conceptual links.
Knowledge is related to concepts, ideas, facts, and certainty, while information is related to com259
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munication, messages, accuracy, and vehicles of message transmission. (Notice that the meanings of “certainty” and “accuracy” are similar but not identical, since the former is absolute while
the latter is probabilistic.)
Indeed, one could argue that the development of information theory in connection with the rise of
computer technology (Gleick, 2011) created the conditions that led to the “tendency to conflate
knowledge and information” (Kenway, Bullen, & Fahey, 2006, p. 16). For example, KM theorist
Keith Devlin (2001, p. 15) defined knowledge in terms of information with the formula, “Knowledge = Internalized information + Ability to utilize the information.” Information scientists similarly define knowledge in terms of information: Marcia Bates (2005) defined knowledge as information given meaning and integrated with other contents of understanding, while Jason Farradane (1980) defined information as the physical surrogate of knowledge. Joseph Nitecki (1985)
sees information and knowledge as stages in a single process.
The notion that knowledge is related to information is in keeping with the changes wrought by the
implementation of computer technology. As we have already seen, such an identification is
linked to a notion of knowledge as related to control, which was not a factor in traditional concepts of knowledge but which is useful in understanding information as a measurable, quantitative, possibly material entity. Knowledge being viewed as information, which can be measured,
has led to professors increasingly being evaluated on the metrics of their productivity. Faculty
members face contradictory pressures to expand the horizons of specialist knowledge while
teaching the basics and generalities. Nowhere are such contradictions felt more keenly than in the
humanities (Miller, 2012). These fields face a crisis of faith in their continuing relevance. One
should also mention backlash from the humanists, with some writers, notably Theodore Roszak
(1994), vehemently rejecting the reduction of knowledge to information, or, to put it another way,
the elevation of information to the status of knowledge. Roszak’s work is a critique of experts
who herald the information age and reliance on computers as something that will better society.
In his words, information does not create ideas, and the mind thinks with ideas, not with information (Roszak, 1994, p. 88).
As an object of study, knowledge is harder to keep in focus than is information. Information science (or studies) has gained momentum as a field of research and practice (Saracevic, 1999),
while knowledge studies does not yet exist in such a sense, despite the occasional use of the term
by Klein (1996, p. 2; 2000a). The closest examples we have of disciplinary identification with
the study of knowledge are KM and KO, both of which are not only applied fields but are oriented to a significant extent around satisfying the needs of clients (cf. Cohen, 1999, 2009).
Taking the informing process as a starting point for analysis, the computer scientist Eli Cohen and
his colleagues at the Informing Science Institute (Murphy, 2011) explicitly seek to develop a
transdisciplinary synthesis among specialists from various disciplines bringing together research
and applications focused on informing. Such a synthesis requires a new kind of theoretical
framework that must take into account practices, mental representations, and policy issues along
with technological and managerial concerns. As such, this network of scholars reflects on previous work in information science, cognitive science, and KM, and seeks to broaden the context
even further in taking the next step in advancing theory. Zbigniew Gackowski (2010) has recently formalized multiple paradigms of informing to serve as the basis of a separate discipline,
defining informing as “the science and art of practical endeavors to increase its effectiveness, ethics, and/or efficiency in extending knowledge and control over reality” (p. 171). Recent articles
in the journal Informing Science have taken up the challenge of filling in these new paradigms of
informing as paramount to discussions about the nature of knowledge by covering the diffusion of
knowledge in society (Losee, 2014), quality assurance as a criterion in the definition of knowledge (Gackowski, 2012), and the value of theoretical and conceptual schemes based on criteria of
accuracy in describing reality versus notions of usefulness or practicality in developing solutions
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(T. G. Gill, 2011). Clearly, the contributors to the informing science literature recognize the need
somehow to fuse and combine applied and purist objectives in the study of knowledge.
A few other writers outside this movement have also stepped outside disciplinary thinking and
have implicitly or explicitly embraced transdisciplinarity in analyzing knowledge. As such, they
can be seen as following in paths charted by the incipient transdisciplinarians discussed earlier.
The remainder of this essay is devoted to examining three recent full-length works specifically on
knowledge (only the first two focus on the networked age). They provide an intriguing sense of
the potential for creative thinking and future research on the subject of knowledge.

Recent Transdisciplinary Studies of Knowledge
The current climate is one in which the ground has shifted in several ways from the baseline of
the post-World War II period seen here as the starting point for moving beyond traditional disciplinary silos in studying knowledge. The end of the Cold War occurred around the same time as
the development of the public Internet and was followed soon thereafter by the unveiling of the
World Wide Web. This was about the same time that the landmark text by Gibbons et al. (1994)
appeared, popularizing the notion of transdisciplinarity. Following the reception of this book and
its sequel (Nowotny et al., 2001), the period has been a favorable one for transdisciplinary cooperation, at least at the planning level, though projects that seem viable on paper may be prone to
fall into the gap because of difficulties of funding and administration (Pfirman & Martin, 2010).
Theories of transdisciplinarity call into question traditional assumptions about the procedures of
science and the production of knowledge. The advent of transdisciplinary research and education
seems to demand that we wipe the slate clean and develop a fresh approach to the meaning of
knowledge, beyond thinking of it mainly in terms of information.
On a fundamental level, our manner of knowing (not just being informed) and our sense of what
knowledge is, has arguably shifted away from the familiar milieu of authoritative knowledge and
expertise, science, education, reliable sources, etc. Among the most interesting voices to weigh
in on this phenomenon has been that of David Weinberger, a technology writer whose latest
book, Too Big to Know (2011), suggests that conventional ways of thinking about knowledge, as
a unified structure, for example, can no longer be justified. Much of the obsolescence of customary foundations of knowledge can be attributed to the transformations wrought by information
technology not only on reading, writing, and other communication, but also on banking, shopping, office work, personal relationships, voluntary associations, political action, police and military surveillance, and almost anything else one can think of. The reason is not the technology
(hardware and software) itself, but the new modes of communication enabled by global connectivity that have become ubiquitous almost overnight, leading to new social structures, new vocabularies and systems of etiquette, contact between persons who could never have crossed paths
before, and so on. Smart phones, global positioning systems, social media, file sharing, Google
Books, Web 2.0, online casinos, and massive open online courses are but a few innovations, each
mind boggling in its own right, that seemed unfathomable when the end of the Cold War heralded
the dawn of the globalized age. With knowledge being networked in ever more new ways,
Weinberger (2011, p. xiii), asserts that knowledge “is becoming inextricable from—literally unthinkable without—the network that enables it.” Traditional notions about knowledge (for example, as a body of vetted works), have their origin in the technology of paper-based communication. Networked knowledge has no shape, structure, or foundation, and notions of factuality and
evidence have shifted to the extent that, to quote the provocative subtitle of his book, “the smartest person in the room is the room.” A case against this somewhat alarmist claim can be found in
Hayek’s (1967, pp. 96-105) observation that not all institutions are planned or designed. As a
case in point, he demonstrates that law is “the result of human action but not of human design,”
and the same argument may be made about knowledge. Nevertheless, Weinberger touches on a
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real cultural shift in attitudes about knowledge that has already affected everyday practices and
mass media, and that may in the long run also affect education, formal science, and research.
The manner in which Weinberger analyzes the evolving context of humans’ relationship to
knowledge and information resources is somewhat sociological, but ultimately it seems to lie outside the disciplinary communication system altogether. Weinberger’s Ph.D. is in philosophy (his
dissertation is on Heidegger) but his position at Harvard University’s Center for Internet & Society situates him at the margins of academia as a public intellectual. Not having to answer to disciplinary or departmental requirements perhaps frees him to concentrate on writing for trade publishers, which in turn enables him to eschew disciplinarity, since trade books do not need to fit
into any list relating to curricular programs. Too Big to Know follows similar books by Clay
Shirky (2010) and Cass Sunstein (2008) that deal with issues of cognitive authority and decision
making in the new frontier of global connectivity. What differentiates Weinberger’s book from
theirs is its ultimate purpose of addressing questions about the nature and significance of knowledge itself.
Even though Weinberger’s subject matter, knowledge, is highly scholarly, he cites very little
scholarly monographic or journal literature. It is the academic literature, of course, that is most
heavily shaped by disciplinarity. Weinberger’s focus on real world phenomena outside the walls
of the ivory tower connects his work to KM, but he is skeptical of managerial notions of knowledge as processed information or something related to control, utility, or getting things done.
Moreover, he does not view knowledge as a resource, nor does his book describe techniques of
maximizing value from human capital, explicating tacit knowledge, or serving the needs or
wishes of clients. In its own way it is a purist, unapplied attempt to put into layman’s terms a
pervasive change in the fundamental meaning of knowledge in a networked, post-paper civilization.
David Hakken (2003) uses the term “cyberspace” to refer to this new stage of civilization. This
now-familiar word was coined by William Gibson in the 1984 science fiction novel Neuromancer
as the name of a nightmarish realm entered by a character in the book when he plugged into a
networked computer (Hakken, 2008). Writing in 1999, Hakken foresaw that cyberspace, by
which he meant “the type of culture being created via Advanced Information technology (AIT),
the congeries of artifacts, practices, and relationships coming together around computing” was
about to become “the dominant mode of human existence” (p. 1). His book Cyborgs@Cyberspace? (1999) examined the problems of and prospects for ethnographic research
on cyberspace. His subsequent book, The Knowledge Landscapes of Cyberspace (2003), focused
specifically on questions about the nature of knowledge in this new environment, particularly the
question of whether the character or social functions of knowledge have changed fundamentally—a question similar to that which motivated Weinberger’s text, but asked right before the
introduction of hardware and software that had already changed the knowledge landscape when
Weinberger wrote his book just a few years later. Hakken, who holds a Ph.D. in anthropology
and who identifies himself as an anthropologist, moved from an interdisciplinary stance combining anthropology and computer science (or rather informatics—see below) toward a transdisciplinary approach to knowledge.
As an anthropologist, his work takes into account anthropological theories of culture and the application of ethnographic methodologies to cyberspace. Clearly, the intellectual space Hakken
claims corresponds to the anthropology of technology (see Pfaffenberger, 1992). But he also
covers epistemology, sociological theory and the sociology of science, and knowledge management. Though he cites only one social epistemologist (Kornblith, 1994), Hakken’s work in itself
also approximates social epistemology. Additionally, his work engages with informatics (the
practices surrounding the use of computers). Hakken prefers this term for the discipline commonly known as “computer science” since he does not consider computing (or AIT as he calls it,
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short for Automated Information Technologies) to be a naturally occurring domain requiring its
own “science.” “Computer science” seems to be over-selling the scientific-ness of computer use,
in the same manner as do terms like “automotive science” or even “information science,” for that
matter. The informatics approach to knowledge is an information-processing one that aims to
model human cognition by analogy to artificial intelligence (AI). Hakken rejects AI as a paradigm and wants to study ethnographically how humans engage with computers at work, in education, and in recreation. Knowledge, he asserts, cannot be understood stripped of its social dimension.
Similar to Polanyi, Hakken approaches knowledge as a process he calls knowledging rather than
viewing knowledge as intellectual content, but like Machlup and Shera (and unlike Polanyi) he
advocates “replacing individualistic conceptions of knowledge with more social ones” (Hakken,
2003, p. 13). Years before Weinberger, he foresaw that computer networking would change the
nature of how humans know, the general significance of knowing, and the social organization of
knowledge. Dissatisfied with KM, he proposes ethnographic methods and theories derived from
anthropology to flesh out the social textures neglected in managerially driven studies and applies
his ethnographic approach to non-governmental organizations and universities. His book covers
the theoretical and methodological problems of studying networked knowledge in organizations
and in education. As a social science approach to networked knowledge, it can be seen as anticipating and laying the groundwork for Lee Rainie and Barry Wellman’s (2012) study of social
networks sponsored by the Pew Research Center’s Internet and American Life Project.
A different, recent transdisciplinary approach has been launched by the Danish scholar Søren
Brier, who, in an array of publications culminating in a major treatise published in 2008, proposes
to reintegrate all disciplines related to information, cognition, and communication. Unlike the
authors discussed above, Brier does not specifically address issues relating to advanced information technology. Brier’s approach takes into account physical and chemical reality, biological
evolution, socially, culturally and linguistically constructed reality, and the phenomenology of
individually experienced reality. Cybersemiotics, as he calls his approach, is daringly and brashly
transdisciplinary through and through. The challenge he lays down is evident, for example, in the
subtitle of his nearly 500 page book: Why information is not enough! In other words, information
is only the starting point in looking at the complexities of human knowledge. His work is unique
and hard to categorize, but it has its roots in a remarkably broad spectrum of scholarship. If one
had to assign his approach (and particularly his book) to just one category, one might call it philosophy, so global and all-encompassing is its scope.
From the term he chose to name his approach, one can tell that his chief inspirations are the cybernetics of Norbert Wiener and the semiotics of Charles Peirce and Thomas Sebeok. Other major sources influencing his work are the animal behaviorists Jakob von Uexküll and Konrad Lorenz, the phenomenologist Edmund Husserl, and the sociologist Niklas Luhmann. He also copiously cites writings by the polymath Gregory Bateson, whose research combined cybernetics,
psychiatry, and anthropology, and the co-authored works of the neuroscientists Humberto
Maturana and Francisco Varela on autopoiesis (self-organizing systems). Beyond the fact that
most of the authors just mentioned were themselves disciplinary border crossers engaging in their
own forms of transdisciplinarity, it should be noted that Brier explicitly labels his work as transdisciplinary, citing key authors on transdisciplinary research such as Edgar Morin, Michael Gibbons, Helga Nowotny, and Erich Jantsch, and he discusses and probes the notion of transdisciplinarity, incorporating the concept into his mission. Though Brier does not cite him, he also seems
to follow in the tradition of the Russian literary scholar Juri Lotman, who proposed the notion of
a semiosphere including both biological and cultural reality, recognizing a common ground between the humanities and the natural sciences (Gherlone, 2013a, 2013b; Lotman, 1984/2005). He
cites the literature on information theory (e.g., Shannon & Weaver, 1949) and information proc-
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essing in cognitive and library and information science, touching on writings by both Machlup
and Polanyi. In light of Brier’s professorship in a business school, it is noteworthy that he does
not refer to the literature on KM or to management issues.
Obviously, cybersemiotics is an extremely subtle and complex concept taking into account numerous theories not covered in this essay. Clearly, Brier’s work is important in constructing new
approaches to knowledge in connection with research and education. As difficult as it is to sum
up his position in a few words, the following quote may illuminate his own view about the nature
of his contribution. In a chapter called “The self-organization of knowledge: Paradigms of
knowledge and their role in deciding what counts as legitimate knowledge,” Brier writes:
I promote an epistemology that treats science as only one aspect of our knowledge, and
human knowledge as extending beyond language into the hypercomplex . . . . This nonreductionist framework promises to open up a non-Cartesian, transdisciplinary understanding of how knowledge is generated and communicated in society, and without losing
what has been gained through the rigor and methods of either the sciences or the logic of
philosophical analysis. (2008, p. 103)

Conclusion
This essay grew out of a sense that knowledge, which is intangible and ineffable, has a paradoxical role as the heart of all intellectual life and thus the defining measure of progress and civilization and the underlying raison d’être of universities and libraries. Concepts of knowledge are
essential in all aspects of inquiry, writing, and practice. Thus, the various compartments of study,
research, and teaching cannot contain it. Knowledge is so basic to academic and educational
thought and discourse as to be taken for granted as furniture, making it difficult to locate the literature on knowledge. Of course, philosophers, who are the original scholars, have been pondering the nature of knowledge since time immemorial. Beyond that, however, we find that the concept of knowledge is highly flexible and susceptible to being subordinated to disciplinary priorities. While philosophy examines knowledge along with other ultimate fundamentals such as
beauty, truth, value, and virtue, in purely analytical terms, the other disciplines also work with
and often theorize about knowledge as it applies to their own domains.
The result is a scattering of scholarly and academic discourses on knowledge that lack a common
ground. More generally, as the study of knowledge is taken over by scholars in the management
area, it loses touch with the humane and liberal arts tradition of scholarship essential to higher
education and libraries. Meanwhile, humanists studying classical or postmodern philosophies
and social scientists conducting ethnographic studies of knowledge practices are prone to be unaware of the potential insights of the KM theorists on knowledge work and the value of knowledge. With knowledge understood in such fundamentally different ways in the different disciplinary approaches, one might sympathize with the tendency of scholars to retreat into their customary ways of thinking about and working with knowledge. At the same time, the recent overwhelming changes in the way information is handled and processed as well as its changed meaning can lead one to reject the new knowledge practices as dumbed-down or an instance of mind
control (cf. Roszak’s, 1994, characterization of his own diatribe against information technology
as “neo-Luddite”). A possible bridge between at least some of the alternative epistemologies can
be found in the philosophy of information, as in the writings of Fred Dretske (1981/1999) and
Luciano Floridi (2011). But as this essay has argued, equating the study of knowledge with that
of information is at some level misguided.
What is missing, and what this article advocates, is a re-visioning of the study of knowledge that
would bring different viewpoints about knowledge into dialogue. This task would be made possible by a transdisciplinary focus on the study of knowledge. Transdisciplinarity is a current

264

Bernstein

trend gathering force in education with applications in science, technology, and planning, as well
as larger global problems. Because of the unique position of knowledge in the scheme of subject
areas, such an approach seems highly appropriate and timely for the study of knowledge. A move
by scholars to discard historical separations between disciplinary domains and re-envision the
meaning of knowledge for humans now and in the future, could, ideally, help revitalize the humanities and social sciences. It would, for example, enable scholars to take up Andrew Abbott’s
(2008, p. 525) challenge to create “a body of theoretical or even empirical speculation about the
nature of library-based scholarship as a general social form: how it is that each individual library
project comes together into a whole and how it is that many such projects come together into
something we call knowledge.”
As this historical-critical study has shown, such an effort has its roots in the works of Machlup
and Polanyi, which would be prominent in a suggested core reading list on knowledge studies. It
is also borne out in the efforts of Shera to merge philosophical epistemology and the sociology of
knowledge under a library science umbrella. More recently, the literature on disciplinarity and its
variations (including transdisciplinarity) puts into focus the problems with segmenting and recombining subject domains. Moving up to the present time, the writings of Weinberger, Hakken,
and Brier exemplify current works that eschew disciplinary boundaries in figuring out problems
about knowledge. Their writings illuminate new challenges to students and scholars as they try to
make sense of the ever-changing knowledge landscape.
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